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Abstract— Cyber-physical Systems (CPSs) are vasly used in 
today’s cities critical infrastructure. The cyber part of these 
systems usually has a network component through which cyber 
attacks can be launched.  In this paper, we first design an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) by indentifying the plant. We assume the 
intial operation period of the CPS is attack-free and learn the plant 
model. Then, we compare the expected output found via the 
identifier with the real one coming through the feedback link. Any 
difference greater than a threshold is deemed to be an anomaly. 
To compensate, once the IDS flags a change in the loop, we restart 
the system identification to find the new transfer function. With 
the estimation of the new transfer function at hand, a new 
controller is designed to keep the system stable.  To test the idea, 
we took a DC motor as the plant and employed ARX identifier. 
Matlab Simulink environment was used to test the proposed 
intrusion detection and compensation framework. We applied a 
set of deception attacks to the forward channel in our experiments. 
The obtained results prove that our detection strategy works well 
and timely reacts to anomalies. Moreover, they show that the 
compensation strategy is also effective and keeps the system stable 
under such attacks.  
Keywords— Intrusion Detection System (IDS), System 
Identification, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Compensation, ARX. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are control systems which 
are composed of sensors, actuators, control, and network 
components. They have been employed in many domains 
including gas pipelines [1], electric power grids [2], medicine 
[3], water networks [4], driver assistance systems [5, 6] and 
autonomous electric vehicles [7]. Using computer networks in 
these systems for communication and interconnection of 
components makes them vulnerable to cyber threats [8]. 
Therefore, appropriate detection and possibly compensation 
techniques are required to counter such cyber attacks. Designing 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for CPSs has gained 
considerable attention [7] due to the consequences of CPSs 
failure. IDS is a necessary complement to security mechanisms 
like firewalls. It detects intrusions and provides forensic reports 
to system administrator or control center to react. IDSs are 
classified into signature-based and anomaly-based categories. 
Signature based methods [9] recognize an intrusion based on a  
previously-known intrusion or attack characteristics. On the 
other side, anomaly detection methods [10, 11] identify an 
intrusion by calculating a deviation from normal system 
behavior. 
Traditional IDSs are inadequate for CPSs as they are 
unaware of the events happening in the physical part of the 
system. Cyber intrusion detection focuses mainly on 
investigating the changes in the physical process outputs which 
cannot be detected by traditional attack detectors or human 
observer.  
This paper is concerned with the detection issue for CPSs 
against deception attacks. Deception attacks compromise the 
integrity of packets, and manipulate the behavior of physical 
process. Some deception attacks are covert and cannot be easily 
perceived by human beings. They slightly modify the behavior 
of the system, but their effect cannot be identified by a human 
observer. This paper tries to model the process or plant normal 
behavior, create a residual error locally by comparing the model 
and plant outputs, and compensating the effect of attack upon 
crossing of the residual error from the detection threshold. 
Accordingly, an intrusion detection approach is proposed which 
detects the unordinary changes in the physical process output by 
using a statistical based threshold. Once the detector detects the 
presence of an attack, the attack function identification process 
is triggered. We assume the attacks are of linear type and can be 
modelled by a transfer function in the frequency/Laplace 
domain or its discrete time equivalent (z-transform). After 
characterizing the attack, the final step of the proposed scheme 
is to design a compensating controller to thwart the negative 
effects of attack. We switch to this second controller once the 
attack is detected and identified. 
To evaluate the proposed scheme, we conduct a set of 
simulations under Matlab Simulink. A DC motor is used as the 
plant of the control system. We simulate packet modification 
attack by using TrueTime tools [12]. The simulation results, as 
presented later, demonstrate that the proposed scheme well 
detect and control deception attacks which cannot be easily 
identified by a human being. Moreover, the compensation 
strategy proves effective in the simulated scenarios.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related 
studies are given in Section II. The proposed detection and 
identification scheme as well as designing a compensating 
controller is presented in Section III. In Section IV, the results 
of simulations on  a sample CPS are reported and discussed. The 
concluding remarks are given in Section V. 
  
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Securing CPSs has emerged as an important issue for most 
governments in last few years. In this context, studies have been 
conducted to security of CPSs in many aspects. For example, the 
security challenges of CPSs have been discussed in detail in [13, 
14]. The paper [15] consider the security and privacy issues in 
intelligent transportation systems which is an example of CPS. 
Cyber-attacks has received increasing attention after the launch 
of the Stuxnet worm [16]. Cyber-attacks in modern CPSs are 
divided in three categories [17]: attacks on the control layer, 
attacks on the communication network, and attacks on the 
physical process. Communication network is more vulnerable 
than other components to cyber-attacks. These cyber-attacks can 
be classified into denial of service (DoS) and deception attacks 
[18]. Deception attacks mention to the possibility of damaging 
the integrity of data packets which change the behavior of 
sensors and actuators [19, 20]. They are also called false data 
injection attack [21]. Conversely, DoS attacks [22] decreases 
access to resources in various ways, such as blocking the 
communication channel.  
The general approach of some researches on the analysis of 
cyber-attacks is investigating the impact of specific attacks on 
particular systems. For example, in [23, 24] a covert (stealth) 
deception attack on the communications network in control and 
monitoring systems have been introduced which is specific 
deception attacks. In this paper a hidden agent changes the 
behavior of the physical system while leaving little residue on 
the main output of the system. Also in [24], the effect of covert 
attacks on control systems is investigated. In this paper, a covert 
deception attack is proposed to disturbance the control system 
operation based on the information collected by another attack. 
The author claims that the co-operation of the two attacks can 
covertly and accurately affect the physical behavior of a system. 
Covert attacks are also mentioned in . The purpose of this paper 
is to design a deception attack for service degradation that can 
be stay stealth and has proved that it can compromises the 
system stability. In that paper, a gain attack as the false signals 
are injected to make an overshoot on a DC motor system. Two 
other papers [25, 26] address the vulnerabilities of control 
systems, in particular modern irrigation channel control systems. 
In this papers, the deceptive attacks on both the forward and the 
backward communication channel are investigated. During this 
deception attack, the attacker sends false data from sensors or 
controllers. These attacks can be carried out by obtaining secret 
keys used by the controllers and physical systems or by 
conquering some of the sensors or controllers.  
Securing the CPSs can be done at several levels. First, some 
preventive techniques are developed that decreases the 
occurrences of attacks. But by increasing the attacks in these 
systems, prevention and resistance techniques can be defeated 
and the development of intrusion detection techniques is a 
necessity. Intrusion detection, identification, and compensation  
is one of the most important defense mechanisms against cyber-
attacks which a great deal of researches [27, 28] on security of 
CPSs and IoT [29] have dealt with it. This mechanism is 
activated after that attacks occur. Most research in this area has 
focused only on the issue of detection, and a few of them have 
payed to identification and compensation of intrusions. In  [30], 
an analytical method for intrusion detection in smart grids based 
on error analysis is presented. The proposed method is based on 
the state estimation algorithm which minimizes the sum of 
squares of error. Paper  [31] present a specification based IDS 
for home area network. Normal behavior of the network is 
defined through selected specifications and deviations from the 
defined normal behavior can be a sign of some intrusions. In a 
similar fashion, in [32] authors developed an algorithm that 
monitors power flow and detects anomalies. This algorithm uses 
principal component analysis to separate regular and irregular 
power flow data. Analysis of the information in this subspace 
determines whether the power system data has been 
compromised. Another research proposed a model based 
intrusion detection and impact reduction for an automatic 
control system [8]. This paper first illustrates the impact of 
deception attacks on automatic generation control (AGC) and 
proposes a general framework for use in intelligent attack 
control. It actually develops a model-based attack detection 
algorithm and mitigates the attack effects. 
 There is a large variety of previous work on intrusion 
detection in CPSs but they have failed to simultaneously detect 
and identify the nature of the attack and design a new controller 
based on detection and identification results. Even methods that 
claim to perform attack identification, actually do the classifying 
of intrusions, rather than fully identifying the nature of the attack 
and its effects.  
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
When a CPS works with a communication network, data 
packets are sent between the controller and plant through the 
network, and may be attacked. The issue under study in this 
section is how to detect (linear) attacks which are launched over 
the network and to control the destructive effect of them.  
A. The Proposed Scheme for Intrusion Detection and 
Compensation  
 
Deception attacks compromise the integrity of data packets 
on communication channel between the controller and the 
physical process. In this paper we study some specific deception 
attacks which cause a steady state error on plant output or make 
system unstable. The proposed model for intrusion detection and 
compensation is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed intrusion detection and compensation 
system 
It is assumed that the feedback channel is secure and attacks 
are launched on the forward channel. It is possible to detect the 
  
attacked place with the help of additional sensors. It is assumed 
that the Man in The Middle (MITM) attack [6] is linear and with 
a transfer function of M(z). The control center tries to detect 
attacks.  
 The solution proposed here is placing an identifier at the 
controller side of the networked system. We could use an 
observer to identify the plant, however, for the sake of simplicity 
in presentation here, we assume that the mathematical model of 
the plant is known to the IDS. If an approximate model of the 
plant is to be used, we should additionally assume that there is a 
secure phase at the beginning of system operation, i.e. when the 
system starts working. During this phase, the identifier learns the 
normal behavior of the original plant and the information about 
the residuals are collected by IDS to determine the detection 
threshold. 
Early detection of intrusion is important to allow 
maintenance or compensation. A common idea is to compare the 
model output with the system output. If the residual error 
exceeds a threshold, there must be an attacker in the loop. This 
of course shall be done when the secure phase is finished.  In 
other words, the difference between the outputs of the 
model/identifier and the physical plant is calculated and 
compared against the detection threshold. Both model and the 
physical plant are fed with the same control signal. Therefore, 
any significant deviation shows an anomaly. The choice of 
threshold plays a significant role at the detection step. A 
common simple thresholding method is η- standard deviation 
[33]. The residuals which is collected in the secure phase is used 
to determine the threshold. Imagine the residual error as a 
random variable with the mean value of mR and the standard 
deviation of sR. It can have e.g. normal distribution. In a simple 
detection strategy, the upper and lower thresholds can be 
determined as follows: 
𝜆௨௣௣ ൌ mோ ൅ ηsோ    
𝜆௟௢௪ ൌ mோ െ ηsோ           (1) η is a tuning parameter which depends on system sensitivity. 
When a linear attack happens in the forward channel, it 
changes the transfer function of the system. In this case, system 
identification methods can be used to identify the current 
dynamic function governing the system (normal system 
dynamic function plus the attacker function). It will help to 
design a proper compensator to counteract the effect of the 
attack. In the proposed scheme, a system identification method 
(ARX estimator) is used for this purpose. Once the detector 
sends the detection signal to the estimator, it is activated. When 
estimation error converges to zero, the dynamics of the new 
system will be known. Then, the new controller parameters can 
be calculated for the new system in the way explained in the next 
section. The controller usually has some design goals, for 
example, to reduce overshoots or even steady-state error. Design 
goals can be met provided that the compensating coefficients are 
set properly. Therefore, reducing the error or increasing the 
stability can be realized when there is a proper relationship 
between the detector, identifier and compensator. The default 
controller has been designed to achieve the performance goals 
assuming that the system transfer function is the one defined by 
the legitimate plant. However, in attack scenarios, we need to 
redesign a substitute controller to achieve the goals using an 
estimation of the attack function. 
B.  System Identificatio 
System identification methods can be used to find the 
dynamics of systems. If the system is linear, linear system 
identification methods can be used. But for nonlinear systems 
there are some other identification techniques (such as a neural 
network)[34]. 
In linear system identification, dynamic models such as 
ARX, ARMA, ARMAX, etc. can be employed. The most 
common model for systems with output feedback is ARX [35] 
which is demonstrated in Fig.2. ARX is popular because its 
parameters can be easily estimated by a linear least squares 
technique.  
 
Fig. 2. ARX model [35] 
u(k) and y(k) are the discrete system input and output. All 
disturbances are transferred to the output in the noise n(k). B(q) 
and A(q) are the numerator and denominator of the transfer 
function of a system by parameters laaa ,...,, 21 and 
mbbb ,...,, 21 . The purpose of identifying the parameters is to 
obtain values that minimize the error between the model output 
and the system output. The best choice for merit function is the 
least sum of squares of error. The ARX model estimator will be 
as Fig. 3 and Eq. (2). 
 
 
Fig. 3. ARX estimator [35] 
In Fig. (3), 𝑦ොሺ𝑘ሻ is the model output for sample k. 
 
𝑦ොሺ𝑘|𝑘 െ 1ሻ ൌ 𝐵ሺ𝑞ሻ𝑢ሺ𝑘ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝐴ሺ𝑞ሻሻ𝑦ሺ𝑘ሻ   (2)   
which can be rewritten as 
 
𝑦ොሺ𝑘|𝑘 െ 1ሻ ൌ 𝑏ଵ𝑢ሺ𝑘 െ 1ሻ ൅ ⋯൅ 𝑏௠𝑢ሺ𝑘 െ𝑚ሻ                        െ𝑎ଵ𝑦ሺ𝑘 െ 1ሻ െ ⋯െ 𝑎௟𝑦ሺ𝑘 െ 𝑙ሻ (3) 
 
assuming deg(A)=l and deg(B)=m. With Eq. (3) the prediction 
error of an ARX model is, 
 
  
𝑒ሺ𝑘ሻ ൌ 𝐴ሺ𝑞ሻ𝑦ሺ𝑘ሻ െ 𝐵ሺ𝑞ሻ𝑢ሺ𝑘ሻ (4) 
We can state that 
𝑦 ൌ 𝑋𝜃 (5) 
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in which N is the number of available data samples. Then to 
obtain the least sum of squares of errors, the optimal parameters 
of the ARX linear model will be as follows: 
𝜃෠ ൌ ሺ𝑋்𝑋ሻିଵ𝑋்𝑦 (6) 
Finally, the calculation of the parameters at the arbitrary step 
k is done using the parameters obtained in step k-1. The use of 
the forget factor will be useful for tracking the parameters, i.e. 
reducing the value of the old data compared to that of the new 
data being entered. This algorithm is capable of tracking the 
system parameters. By increasing the number of samples to 
infinity, 𝜃෠ →  𝜃. 
C. Designing the Controller 
 The block diagram of a classic well known feedback control 
system is shown in Fig. 4, where C(z) is the controller function, 
G(z) represents the system (plant) function, and signals r, e, u 
and y denote the reference value, control error, control signal 
and sensed output variable, respectively. In our case, G(z) is 
actually composed of the attacker’s transfer function (M(z)) and 
the original plant transfer function (H(z)).  
 
Fig. 4. Block diagram of a feedback control system 
There are a veriety of controllers which are used in CPSs and 
other industrial applications. Proportional, integral and 
derivative (PID) controller  [36] is a kind of controller which is 
widely used in these systems. It tries to minimize difference 
between a setpoint and a received sensed or measured variable 
along the feedback line and accordingly applies a control signal 
to improve the dynamic response. Generally speaking, 
the proportional gain reduces error signal, the integral controller 
reduces steady-state error and the derivative controller improves 
transient response. The PID controller continues time transfer 
function can be shown as [37]: 
𝐶ሺ𝑠ሻ ൌ 𝑘௣ ൅ 𝑘௜𝑠 ൅ 𝑘ௗ𝑠 
   
(7)   
Where ip kk ,  and dk are the coefficients for the proportional, 
integral and derivative terms. 
The essential problem in designing a PID controller is to 
determine its parameters which guarantee stabilization of the 
loop. Many studies have worked on the computation of all 
stabilizing P, PI and PID controllers parameteres [38, 39]. 
Consider the single-input single-output control system where,  
𝐺ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ Aሺzሻ𝐵ሺ𝑧ሻ                               (8)                                    
is the plant to be controlled.  
We take a PID controller for example though a generic PID 
controller could be designed similarly. C(z) is a descrete PID 
controller which by approximation, can be written as: 
𝐶ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 𝑘௣ ൅ 𝑘௜𝑇௦𝑧 െ 1 ൅ 𝑘஽ 𝑁1 ൅𝑁𝑇௦ 1𝑧 െ 1  (9)   
where in implementation, 𝑇௦ is the sampling time and 𝑁 is the 
filter coefficient. The problem is to compute the parameters of 
PID in Eq. (9) that stabilize the system of Fig. 4. The closed loop 
transfer function of the system shown in Fig. 4 (by considering 
the G(z) and C(z) as Eq. (8) and Eq. (9)) is: YሺzሻRሺzሻ ൌ GሺzሻCሺzሻ1 ൅ GሺzሻCሺzሻ       (10) 
                           
The stability of such a system is determined by the location of 
the poles of the closed loop transfer function in the z-plane or, 
the roots of the closed loop characteristic polynomial 1 ൅GሺzሻCሺzሻ ൌ 0. When there is no attack, Gሺzሻ ൌ 𝐻ሺ𝑧ሻ. 
For the system to be stable, all the roots of carachteristic 
equation must lie in the unit circle in the z-plane. The system is 
unstable if any closed loop pole lies outside the unit circle. In 
our scheme, we want to control the attacked system by a new 
compensator 𝐶′ሺ𝑧ሻ. This compensator is a PID controller that 
replaces the original controller once attack is detected. We 
assume the identified attacked system by ARX estimator is 
shown by 𝐺′ሺ𝑧ሻ , which is presumably an approximation of 
)()( zHzM . Then, we are going to determine the parameters 
ip kk ,  and dk , that make the roots of  1 ൅ 𝐺′ሺ𝑧ሻ𝐶′ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 0 stay 
inside the unit circle.  
By solving this equation, the stability region for  ip kk ,  and 
dk is obtained in a 3D space. The PID controller parameters can 
be then selected from the stable region.  
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The proposed scheme is implemented in TrueTime 
environment [12].  One controller and one plant node are 
  
considered which communicate through a Controlled Area 
Network (CAN) bus [40] with each other.  The example plant 
which we have used in this study consists of a second-order plant 
(DC motor). DC motor is a popular actuator in control systems. 
We take an example in which the plant is being normally 
controlled by a PI controller. The PI controller and plant transfer 
functions are linear time-invariant (LTI) and the set point of this 
system is defined by a (unit) step function. In the experiment, 
the discrete time transfer function of the controller and the plant 
are, 
𝐻ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 9.96 ൈ 10ି଻𝑧 ൅ 9.92 ൈ 10ି଻𝑧ଶ െ 1.988𝑧 ൅ 0.9881   (11) 
 
 
𝐶ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ ሺ30.2𝑧 െ 29.97ሻ𝑧 െ 1   (12) 
 
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, 
simulations are conducted. The first implemented attack is a 
gain attack which makes the plant unstable. In this attack 
M(z)=160.  
In these simulations, the transmission bit rate is set to 250kbps 
to match J1939 CAN protocol specifications. Also, the secure 
time span is 5 seconds from the beginning of the simulation, 
sampling time (𝑇௦ሻ is 0.001s and the attack is launched at 𝑡 = 5s. 
Fig. 5 shows the normal output/behavior of system when there 
is no attack. In normal operation, the output of plant (motor 
speed) rises sharply and gradually converges to one when a step 
like set point with the value of one is applied.  
In the mentioned gain -attack case, IDS detects the attack at 
t=5.003s, merely a few milliseconds after the launch. At this 
time, the ARX estimator is enabled. The estimation error reaches 
7e-15 by t=5.075s. A small error implies that the identification 
process of system dynamics is completed. The result of 
identification process in the simulations is, 
 
𝐺′ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 1.59359996 ൈ 10ିସ𝑧 െ 1.58720003 ൈ 10ିସ𝑧ଶ െ 1.98799999𝑧 ൅ 0.988099999  
                                                                                        (13) 
 
which is close to )().( zHzM but not identical. 𝐺′ሺ𝑧ሻ  is an 
estimated function of system dynamics (𝐺ሺ𝑧ሻ ). We take a 
substitute PI controller (𝐶′ሺ𝑧ሻ) as an example and determine 𝑘௜   
and 𝑘௣ that keep the attacked system stable.  
𝐶′ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 𝑘௣ ൅ 𝑘௜𝑇௦𝑧 െ 1  (14)   
 To find the stability region, we should determine the parameters 
𝑘௣ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘௜  that make the roots of 1 ൅ 𝐺′ሺ𝑧ሻ𝐶′ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 0  stay 
inside the unit circle.                     1 ൅ 𝐺ᇱሺ𝑧ሻ𝐶ᇱሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 𝑧ଷ ൅ ൫𝑏ଵ െ 1 ൅ 𝑘௣𝑎ଵ൯𝑧ଶ                      ൅൫𝑏ଶ െ 𝑏ଵ ൅ 𝑘௣𝑎ଶ െ 𝑘௣𝑎ଵ ൅ 𝑇௦𝑘௜𝑎ଵ൯𝑧                      ൅൫െ𝑏ଶ െ 𝑘௣𝑎ଶ ൅ 𝑇௦𝑘௜𝑎ଶ൯ ൌ 0 
(15)   
 
where 𝑎ଵ ൌ 1.59359996 ൈ 10ିସ , 𝑎ଶ ൌ െ1.58720003 ൈ10ିସ , 𝑏ଵ ൌ െ1.98799999 , 𝑏ଶ ൌ 0.988099999  and 𝑇௦ ൌ0.001𝑠. By using the characteristic polynomial formed on the 
basis of Eq. (15) and a parametric PI controller defined in Eq. 
(14), one can find the stabilizing region based on 𝑘௜   and 𝑘௣. 
Once the stability region is found based on the parameters 
𝑘௣ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘௜ , one can pick a pair that satisfies the desired 
performance criteria (like small overshoot or steady state error). 
By solving the Eq.(15), we found the values of parameteres 𝑘௜ 
and 𝑘௣  which make the roots of Eq. (15) stay inside the unit 
Fig. 5. Behavior (motor speed) of the plant under normal condition. 
 
Fig. 6. Stability region in the (kp , ki)  plane (for the system with a gain 
attack=160). The darker area shows where the system is stable. 
Fig. 7. Behavior of attacked system (for a gain attack=160) with and 
without  IDS and compensator by kp=50 and ki=100.   
  
circle. Fig. 6 shows the result. For the mentioned gain attack, 
selected parameters for compensation are kp=50 and ki=100.  
The output of the case in which attack was launched on the 
channel, but no IDS or compensator was involved, and also the 
output of the case in which the proposed intrusion detection, 
identification and compensation scheme was involved are 
shown in Fig. 7. Attacker made the system completely unstable. 
This is obvious from the oscillating output of the system. In 
Fig.7 IDS flag is raised at 5.003s and the compensation by the 
substitute controller is  activated at 5.075s. It shows the system 
with IDS and compensator can tolerate the attack more and 
guarantee the stability. The picked proportional gain and the 
integral componenet have made system stable and reduced the 
steady state error of the attacked system, respectively. 
The proposed scheme is implemented also with another 
deception attack which makes a steady-state error. To do so, we 
use a discrete transfer function (M(z)) as the MITM attacker, 
similar to the one presented in reference [24],  
𝑀ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 0.7𝑧 െ 0.7𝑧 െ 1.0001 (16) 
In this case, attack is detected at t=5.023s, and the estimation 
error reaches 6e-16 by t=5.12s. The result of ARX estimator for 
system by mentioned attack is as, 
 
𝐺ሺ𝑧ሻ ൌ 6.972 ൈ 10ି଻𝑧ଶ ൅ 0.028 ൈ 10ି଻𝑧 െ 6.944 ൈ 10ି଻𝑧ଷ െ 2.988100049𝑧ଶ ൅ 2.976298898𝑧 െ 0.988198859 
                                                                                        (17) 
For the system with this steady state error attack, stability region 
based on proportional and integral components of PI 
compensator has been shown in Fig. 8. Also, Fig. 9 shows the 
system output. When there is no IDS or compensator, the 
attacker  manages  to  create  a  steady state error of magnitude 
0.032 which, by given the original controller, does not converge 
to zero. With the proposed intrusion detection, identification and 
the designed compensator, the system can tolerate the attacks 
more. In Fig.9, it is easy to see that the response curve has 
become better and the steady state error was reduced to 0.005 at 
t=14s by using PI controller by parameters kp=2000 and 
ki=1500 as compensator. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are vulnerable to cyber 
attacks in their communication layer. Packet manipulation and 
deception attacks may significantly impair the control system 
properties such as steady state error, rise and settling time and 
overshoot/undershoot. In order to recognize the characteristics 
of the attack and take better decisions, a detection, 
identification and compensation mechanism is proposed in this 
paper. In the adversarial model studied, it is assumed that the 
feedback channel is secure, and attacks are launched on the 
forward channel. The intrusion detector uses a model of the 
plant obtained by an identifier at the controller side. The 
identifier follows the normal behavior of the original plant and 
can help to detect any deviation from the benign behavior. Once 
the attack is detected, assuming that it can be approximated by 
a linear function, an ARX estimator finds the new dynamic 
function and accordingly, the controller is updated to cope with 
the attack condition. The goal is to keep the system under attack 
stable and with desired output. To evaluate the performance of 
the proposed method, simulations have been conducted using 
Matlab Simulink and TrueTime tools. A DC motor has been 
used as the example in simulations. We put the idea to test with 
a two deception attacks. Simulation results show that the 
proposed method can effectively help the control system remain 
stable under such attack scenarios and compensate the negative 
effects of attacks. For the future work, we aim to extend the 
proposed approach to support nonlinear systems as well as 
attacks. 
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